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Milking The New Sacred Cow: The
Supreme Court Limits the Peremptory
Challenge on Racial Grounds in
Powers v. Ohio and Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co.
"The earnestness of this Court's commitment to racial justice is not to be mea-
sured by its willingness to expand constitutional provisions designed for other
purposes beyond their proper bound&."1
-Justice Antonin Scalia
I. INTRODUCTION
In dealing with racial discrimination, courts have constantly been
pulled in two directions, desiring on the one hand to assist in the bat-
tle against racism, and yet struggling to remain loyal to legal prece-
dent and to adhere to established law.2 Often, in the struggle to deal
justly with racial issues, the temptation is strong for courts to step
outside of legal precedent in order to impose judge-made remedies
designed to curb racial discrimination.3
Traditionally, conservative justices have held fast to a philosophy
prompting adherence to a strict construction of the Constitution in
an attempt to leave lawmaking to the nation's elected legislative bod-
ies.4 This course of action generally stems from a commitment to
"judicial restraint," a doctrine intended to avoid judge-made remedies
1. Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803, 811 (1990).
2. See generally Alexander Aleinikoff, Article: A Case For Race-Consciousness, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 1060 (1991) (discussing the ambivalence of the Court in addressing ra-
cial issues); David Chang, Discriminatory Impact, Affirmative Action, and Innocent
Victims: Judicial Conservatism or Conservative Justices?, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 790
(1991) (analyzing the morality of Court decisions involving race); Sheri Lynn Johnson,
Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611 (1985) (arguing that fur-
ther equal protection safeguards are necessary to eliminate racial discrimination from
the courtroom).
3. But see ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990) [hereinafter BORK].
"Many people have the notion that following precedent (sometimes called the doctrine
of stare decisis) is an iron clad rule. It is not and has never been." Id. at 156-58.
4. See, e.g., BORK at 143-60.
and to encourage sound, comprehensive legislation representative of
the electorate.5 Liberal justices, however, have typically been willing
to take greater liberties in their interpretation of the Constitution in
order to achieve more immediate and just results in the case before
them.6
The judicial philosophy of the Supreme Court justices has become
increasingly significant in the area of raced-based issues because the
composition of the Court is slowly moving to the right. In fact, with
the recent confirmation of Clarence Thomas, it could be strongly ar-
gued that the Supreme Court has become one of the most conserva-
tive courts of the twentieth century.7 Naturally, many fear that this
shift in the Court's composition will effectively erase the strides
made toward the imposition and expansion of "civil rights" dogma.8
Surprisingly, recent indicators demonstrate that in some instances
the current Court is willing to take liberties in its interpretation of
precedent in order to combat racism.9 For example, a recent line of
Supreme Court decisions indicates that the Court ruled that litigants
must be given the right to challenge the racially biased use of per-
emptory challenges during voir dire.'0 In Batson v. Kentucky," a
5. Generally, judicial restraint is defined as a "[s]elf-imposed discipline by judges
in deciding cases without permitting themselves to indulge their own personal views or
ideas which may be inconsistent with existing decisional or statutory law." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 762 (5th ed. 1979). Moreover, "It]here are three basic elements of ju-
dicial restraint: An interpretivist approach to the Constitution; a deference to the po-
litically accountable branches of government; and an adherence to judicial precedent."
James E. Wyszynski, Jr., In Praise of Judicial Restraint: The Jurisprudence of Justice
Antonin Scalia, 1989 DET. C.L. REV. 117, 121-29 (1989) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter
WYSZYNSKI] (citing Wallace, Whose Constitution? An Inquiry into the Limits of Con-
stitutional Interpretation, in STILL THE LAW OF THE LAND? 1 (1987) & Wright, The
Judicial Right and the Rhetoric of Restraint: A Defense of Judicial Activism in an Age
of Conservative Judges, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 487, 490 (1987)).
6. Bork, supra note 3, at 206-21.
7. See supra notes 5-6 and infra notes 8-9.
8. ACLU of Northern California Opposed Thomas Nomination, S.F. CHRON.,
Sept. 17, 1991, at A3; Danny Goldberg, Perspectives on the Supreme Court It's Religion
in Sheep's Clothing, Thomas'Notions of Natural Law Would Lead Him to Side With
Religious Groups and Against the Right to Abortion, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1991, at B5;
Lind P. Campbell, Black Debate on Thomas Carries Over to Hearings, CHI. TRIB., Sept.
20, 1991, at C1.
9. Professor Jesse H. Choper, Dean, and Earl Warren, Professor of Public Law at
the University of California at Berkeley, recently commented on this issue at the U.S.
Law Week's Constitutional Law Conference held on September 6-7, 1991. Professor
Choper stated that "the dominance of the conservatives will [not] mean that the Court
'will rarely invoke the Bill of Rights or almost always be insensitive to personal liber-
ties.'" 60 U.S.L.W. 2253, October 23, 1991, available in LEXIS, Omni Library. [herein-
after CHOPER].
10. Professor Choper cited 17 cases indicating the Court's "continued sensitivity"
to civil individual rights. See, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2354 (1991) ("results
test" of 1982 Voting Rights Act amendments applies to judges who are elected); Burns
v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 2182 (1991) (under the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure, notice must be given to criminal defendants before judge is allowed to depart
from sentencing guidelines); Connecticut v. Doehr, 111 S. Ct. 2105 (1991) (due process
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1986 case involving the race-motivated use of peremptory challenges,
the Supreme Court held that an African American criminal defend-
ant may challenge the peremptorial strike of an African American
venirepersonX2 during voir dire13 upon a showing of prejudice on the
part of the prosecution. More recently, in Powers v. Ohio 14 and Ed-
nonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,i5 the Court expanded the scope of
Batson and held that a Caucasian defendant may challenge the exclu-
sion of an African American from the jury in a criminal trial,16 and a
litigant in a civil trial may challenge any alleged discriminatory use
of peremptory challenges by opposing counsel.17
is violated where a court makes a prejudgment attachment of real property before no-
tice and a hearing); Clark v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2096 (1991) (Louisiana violated
preclearance procedures of the Voting Rights Act); Yates v. Evatt, 111 S. Ct. 1884
(1991) (harmful error where jury given erroneous instruction concerning the presump-
tion of malice regarling the intent to kill); Arizona v. Fulminante, Ill S. Ct. 1246
(1991) (a coerced confession is not harmless error); International Union, United Auto-
motive Workers of America v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991) (sex dis-
crimination found in employer's fetal protection policy precluding females of
childbearing capacity from certain jobs); Demarest v. Manspeaker, 111 S. Ct. 599 (1991)
(state prisoner who testifies at federal trial is entitled to witness fees); Minnick v. Mis-
sissippi, 111 S. Ct. 486 (1990) (no further questioning allowed once defendant requests
counsel after administration of Miranda warnings, even if defendant has since con-
sulted with his attorney).
11. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
12. Black's Law Dictionary defines venire as "It]he group of citizens from whom a
jury is chosen in a given case." BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY 1556 (6th ed. 1990). Accord-
ingly, a venireperson is a member of the venire. It is important for the reader to real-
ize that a member of the venire who is excluded never becomes a member of the jury.
Thus, in both Edmonson and Powers, the excluded venireperson was excused during
voir dire and never took part in the trial.
13. Voir dire is defined as "the preliminary examination which the court and at-
torneys make of prospective jurors [venirepersons] to determine their qualifications
and suitability to serve as jurors." Id. at 1575.
14. 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991). Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion in Powers
in which Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor and Souter joined.
Justice Scalia wrote the dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist joined.
15. 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991). Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion in Edmon-
son in which Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens and Souter joined. Justice
O'Connor wrote the dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia joined. Justice Scalia also wrote a separate dissenting opinion.
16. Powers, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991). See generally Katherine Goldwasser, Limiting
a Criminal Defendant's Use of Peremptory Challenges: On Symmetry and the Jury in
a Criminal Trial, 102 HARv. L. REV. 808 (1989) (giving the history of peremptory chal-
lenge jurisprudence and arguing against the extension of Batson to criminal defend-
ants); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV.
1611 (1985); Phyllis Novick Silverman, Comment, Survey of the Law of Peremptory
Challenges: Uncertainty in the Criminal Law, 44 U. Pirr. L. REV. 673 (1983) (discuss-
ing current trends in law regarding the peremptory challenge and arguing for the re-
laxation of the Swain standard).
17. Edmonson, 1.11 S. Ct. 2077 (1991). See generally Equal Protection - Jury Se-
The court's implementation of these policies appears to be helpful,
and might even prove to be effective in curbing racism in the court-
room. However, the methods used by the Court in achieving its new
policy, and the long term effects of those methods, could have an ad-
verse impact on the development of jurisprudence in this country. In
both cases discussed in this comment, the Court appeared to maneu-
ver outside of established precedent in order to expand the tradi-
tional Article III standing rulesls and to institute a novel approach to
the state action doctrine of the Fourteenth Amendment.19
In addressing the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in
the court system, the Powers and Edmonson Courts discussed two ba-
sic issues: third party standing and state action. Following this intro-
duction, part II of this note will discuss the general history of
peremptory challenges in modern Anglo-American jurisprudence.
Part III will examine the Court's analysis of the issue of third party
standing as raised in Powers. Next, part IV will evaluate the Court's
examination of the issue of state action in Edmonson as applied to
the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by civil litigants. Fi-
nally, part V will discuss the impact of these two cases.
This note takes the position that the Court's goal of fighting racism
in the courtroom is praiseworthy. However, the road taken to
achieve this goal, although paved with good intentions, might in the
long run provide further justification for judges to disregard the leg-
islative process in rendering their decisions. In short, a legislative so-
lution would be more appropriate. Moreover, while the Court's
decisions might prove to curb racism in the short run, they could also
impose burdensome and unrealistic requirements on trial courts, pos-
sibly locking up trial proceedings and making the "voir dire a Title
VII proceeding in miniature."20
II. HISTORY OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
A. Statutory History
1. England
The investigation of peremptory challenges reveals a deep history
that can be traced back to the English Crown.21 At English common
lection - Eleventh Circuit Restricts the Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges
in Civil Litigation-Fludd v. Dukes, 863 F.2d 822 (11th Cir. 1989), 103 HARV. L. REV.
586 (1989).
18. The Supreme Court introduced a liberal version of the relationship require-
ment and the first person injury-in-fact requirement of the third party standing doc-
trine. See Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
19. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
20. Hawaii v. Levinson, 795 P.2d 845, 857 (Haw. 1990) (Wakatsuki, J., dissenting)
(quoting United States v. Clark, 737 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1984)).
21. WALTER E. JORDAN, JURY SELECTION: THE LAW, ART AND SCIENCE OF SELECT-
[Vol. 19: 691, 1992] Powers v. Ohio
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law, peremptory challenges were used in both civil and criminal tri-
als.22 In criminal trials, jurors were initially chosen by the Crown,
which enjoyed an unlimited use of peremptories. 23 However, this un-
checked power was limited by a statute enacted in the year 1305
which provided that the prosecutor in a criminal case could no longer
exercise peremptories at will.24 Despite this statute, however, the
treatment of venirepersons was not substantially altered. This is be-
cause subsequent to the statutory restriction on the prosecutor's use
of peremptories in 1305, another doctrine developed which permitted
a prosecutor to ask a venireperson to "stand aside."25 This doctrine
provided that where the prosecutor wanted to strike a juror, instead
of exercising a peremptory challenge on the spot, the prosecutor
could request that the venireperson "stand aside." 26  Thus, the
venireperson would then wait until the venire had been exhausted.
If at that time a suitable jury still had not been agreed upon, the
Crown could only exclude the venireperson who stood aside "for
cause."
2 7
Although peremptory challenges fell into disuse in England over a
century ago,2 8 the right to exercise them remained an important con-
ING A JURY, § 8.01 ('1988) [hereinafter JORDAN]; See also Douglas Colbert, Challenging
the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Per-
emptory Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1990) (tracing the history of the peremp-
tory challenge from its origin in English Common Law, through the early days of
colonial America, up to modern-day jurisprudence). Colbert complements his discus-
sion of the history of the peremptory challenge with constant reference to its effect on
African American jurors. Id
22. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212-13 (1965); JORDAN, supra note 21, at 269;
See also Kabatchnick v. Hanover-Elm Building Corp., 119 N.E.2d 169, 172 (Mass. 1954)
(discussing commentaries on the debate whether peremptory challenges were origi-
nally allowed in civil cases).
23. JORDAN, supra note 21, at 270.
24. Swain, 380 U.S. at 213 (citing The Ordinance for Inquests, 33 Edw 1, stat 4
(1305) ("they that sue for the King will challenge any ... Jurors, they shall assign...
a Cause certain")). See also COKE ON LITILETON 156 (14th ed. 1791); JON M. VAN
DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTA.
TIVE PANELS 147 (1977).
25. See JORDAN, supra note 21, at 270; See also Swain, 380 U.S. at 213 n.9 (citing 4
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 353 (15th ed. 1809)); id. at 213 n.11 (citing Lord Grey's
Case, 9 How.St.Tr. 128 (1682); Regina v. Frost, 9 Car. & P. 129 (1839); Mansell v. Re-
gina, 8 El. & B1. 54 (1857)).
26. Swain, 380 U.S. at 213.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 213 n.12 (citing I JAMES F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
OF ENGLAND 303 (1958); PATRICK DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 29-37 (1956); PENDLETON
HOWARD, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 362-64 (1931)).
sideration, at least in principle,29 and thus, such enabling statutes re-
mained on the books.30 The "stand aside" doctrine remained the law
in England, although in recent times the number of defense per-
emptories was lowered to seven.3 1 Nonetheless, England recently
completely abolished the use of peremptory challenges under the
Criminal Justice Act of 1988.32
2. United States
In the United States, at common law, peremptory challenges were
widely permitted and utilized.33 However, the right to use peremp-
tory challenges is not explicitly recognized in the United States Con-
stitution.3 4 Thus, most federal courts refer to the common law or to
statutes for the authority supporting the use of peremptory chal-
lenges.35 Moreover, state legislatures have emulated the federal sys-
29. Id. (citing STEPHEN, supra note 28, at 303; DEVLIN, supra note 28, at 29-37;
HOwARD, supra note 28 at 362).
30. Blackstone noted in a famous quote that a peremptory challenge is "a provi-
sion full of that tenderness and humanity to prisoners, for which our English laws are
justly famous." Id. at 212 n.9 (citing 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 353 (15th ed.
1809)).
31. See Swain, 380 U.S. at 213 N.12 (citing 6 Geo. 4, c. 50, § 29 (1825); 11 & 12 Geo.
6, c. 58, § 35 (Criminal Justice Act of 1948)); see also DEVLIN, supra note 28, at 28.
32. See generally, James J. Gobert, The Peremptory Challenge - An Obituary, 1989
CRIM. L. REV. 528. Pursuant to a discussion of the history of peremptories in England,
it is important to note that the English justice system never used the extensive voir
dire preceedings which have become common in America. Thus, because an attorney
in England would only know the venireperson's name, sex and address, peremptories
played a much smaller role in jury selection and were eventually done away with alto-
gether. See W. CORNISH, THE JURY 46 (1968); Jere W. Morehead, Prohibiting Race
Based Peremptory Challenges: Should the Principle of Equal Protection be Extended to
Private Litigants?, 65 TUL. L. REV. 833, 835-36 (1991) (discussing the effect of the Bat-
son rationale in both criminal and civil cases). Only three months after Morehead's
article was published, the Court in Edmonson ruled on many issues that the article
raised concerning the civil arena.
33. JORDAN, supra note 21, at 270-71; Swain, 380 U.S. at 212-18.
34. Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919). "There is nothing in the Con-
stitution of the United States which requires the Congress to grant peremptory chal-
lenges." Id. Moreover, it is settled that it is not unconstitutional to repeal a statutory
right to use peremptory challenges. Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 82 (1988).
35. United States v. Douglass, 25 F. Cas. 896 (C. C. S.D.N.Y. 1851) (No. 14,989);
United States v. Johns, 26 F. Cas. 616, (C.D. Pa. 1806) (No. 15,481); United States v.
Wilson, 28 F. Cas., (C. Ct. Pa. 1830) (No. 16,730). But see United States v. Cottingham,
25 F. Cas. 673, (C. Ct. N.D.N.Y. 1852) (No. 14,872). In 1790, the United States Congress,
pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act of 1790, established the number of peremptories
permissible in criminal trials. 1 Stat. 119 (1790). A defendant was allowed 35 per-
emptories in trials for treason and 20 in trials concerning a felony punishable by death.
Id. In 1865, that number was changed to allow a defendant in capital or treason trials
20 peremptories, while the prosecution was only allowed five. 13 Stat. 500 (1865);
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, at 214-15 (1965). In non-capital cases, the defense was
allowed ten challenges and the prosecution was allowed three. Swain, 380 U.S. at 215
n.14.
In 1872, the number of peremptories in civil cases and criminal misdemeanors was
raised to three for both the prosecution and the defense. Id. See 17 Stat. 282 (1872).
[Vol. 19: 691, 1992] Powers v. Ohio
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tern in establishing the statutory right to use peremptory
challenges.3 6
B. History of American Case Law Regarding the Discriminatory
Use of Peremptory Challenges
1. The Early Cases
Any exhaustive analysis of case law pertaining to discrimination in
jury selection must begin with a trilogy of cases decided just before
the turn of the century: Strauder v. West Virginia,37 Neal v. Dela-
ware,38 and Ex Parte Virginia.39 In these three cases, the United
States Supreme Court established the foundation for jurisprudence
concerning discrimination in the jury selection process.
In Strauder v. West Virginia, an African American male convicted
of murder challenged his conviction by alleging that a state law4 o
preventing African Americans from sitting on juries denied him
equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution.41 In addressing the challenge, the Court prefaced its
holding by stating that an accused does not have the right to a jury
composed of persons of his own race. Next, the Court considered
whether a law could exclude potential jurors on the basis of race;42
the Court concluded that any law which intentionally discriminates
against the admission of minorities into the venire is proscribed by
In noncapital cases, the defense enjoyed ten strikes, while the prosecution could use
only three. Swain, 380 U.S. at 215 N.14. Under current federal law, in trials for capital
crimes, felonies, and misdemeanors, defendants are allowed 20, 10, and 3 strikes, re-
spectively, and the prosecution is permitted 20, 6, and 3 challenges. FED. R. CRIM.
PRoc. 24(b). See also JORDAN, supra note 21, at 270. In civil cases, both the prosecu-
tion and defense are allowed three peremptories each. 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1988).
36. See VAN DYKE, supra note 24, at 282-84. Under state law, peremptory chal-
lenges are provided for both plaintiffs and defendants in civil cases, and the prosecu-
tion and defense in criminal cases. Id. In fourteen states, the defendant is allowed
more peremptory challenges than the prosecution in felony trials. I Similarly, in the
federal system, when the alleged crime is punishable by more than one year in prison,
the defense is allowed more challenges than the prosecution. See FED. R. CRIM. PROC.
24(b); see also Swain, 380 U.S. at 215 n.14.
37. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
38. 103 U.S. 370 (1879).
39. 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
40. 1872-73 W. VA. ACTs 102. See also Strauder, 100 U.S. at 305.
41. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 305. The law read, "All white male persons who are
twenty-one years of age and who are citizens of this State shall be liable to serve as
jurors, except as herein provided." Id The exception concerned government officials.
lI
42. Id. at 305.
the equal protection clause and is invalid.43
In Neal v. Delaware, the Court dealt with a similar issue when an
African American convicted rapist claimed that he had been denied
equal protection because no African American was chosen to sit on
his jury.44 The trial court did not allow the defendant to present evi-
dence showing that African Americans had been excluded from the
venire.45 Dissenting, Justice Waite expressed reservations about re-
versing the conviction because the record was devoid of evidence
which supported the defendant's proposition.46 However, the major-
ity ruled that the defendant had been denied equal protection be-
cause he was not given ample opportunity to present evidence that
potential jurors had been excluded from the venire based on race.47
In the last of this trilogy of cases, Ex Parte Virginia, a judge was
charged with violating a federal statute48 prohibiting court officials
from allowing discrimination in the jury selection process.49 In deny-
ing the judge's petition for habeas corpus, the Court reasoned that
section five of the Fourteenth Amendment5 O empowered Congress to
promulgate legislation enforcing the rights granted by the amend-
ment.51 Because the statute at issue was found to be constitutional,
and the judge had indeed acted in a discriminatory fashion in pre-
cluding African Americans from sitting on a jury, the judge's petition
was denied.52
Thus, the foundation the Court laid in these three cases was one of
hostility toward overtly discriminatory laws and acts designed to pre-
clude African Americans from participating in trials as jurors. While
the Supreme Court did not contend that a defendant has the right to
a racially diverse jury,53 the Court did determine that no person may
be denied participation on a venire because of race.54
43. Id at 310.
44. Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 371-72 (1879).
45. Id. at 376.
46. Id at 398.
47. Id. at 396-97.
48. 18 Stat., pt. 3, 336 (1875); Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 344 (1879).
49. Er Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 340.
50. Article V, section 5, of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution reads: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
51. Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 347.
52. Id. at 349.
53. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1880). See Theil v. Southern Pa-
cific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946). Although the American system "contemplates an
impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the community .... [t]his does not mean,
of course, that every jury must contain representatives of all the economic, social, reli-
gious, racial, political and geographic groups of the community. Id. (citations
omitted).
54. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310.
[Vol. 19: 691, 1992] Powers v. Ohio
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2. Swain v. Alabama
Until the Supreme Court's 1965 decision in Swain v. Alabama,55
the law relating to discrimination in jury selection remained true to
the Strauder line of cases and maintained the imperative that Afri-
can Americans were not to be excluded from the venire due to their
race.5 6 This principle was founded upon the Sixth Amendment
right57 to a jury consisting of a fair cross section of the community5 8
as well as the Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of
the laws.59 Although the Court's decision in Swain did little to actu-
ally change jury selection jurisprudence, it did introduce the issue of
the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges into the legal
forum.60
In Swain, the defendant challenged his rape conviction by assert-
ing that the composition of his jury fell short of equal protection re-
quirements.6 1 The defendant argued that the State had purposefully
excluded African Americans from participation as jurors.62 In sup-
port of his position, Mr. Swain produced statistics showing that
55. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
56. See Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Hollins v. Oklahoma, 295 U.S. 394
(1935) (per curiam); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939); Patton v. Mississippi, 332
U.S. 463 (1947); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475
(1954).
57. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads in pertinent
part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed .... " U.S. CONSTIT. amend. VI.
58. See, e.g., Toni M. Massaro, Peremptories or Peers? - Rethinking Sixth Amend-
ment Doctrine, Images, and Procedures, 64 N.C. L. REV. 501, 502 (1986) (proposing the
elimination of the prosecutor's right to peremptory challenges in a criminal trial in an
attempt to safeguard a defendant's sixth amendment right to a jury "composed of at
least some of the defendant's peers"); James H. Druff, Comment, The Cross-Section Re-
quirement and Jury Impartiality, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1555 (1985) (analyzing the peremp-
tory challenge in light of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence and proposing an
abolishment of the peremptory challenge altogether and a broadening of challenges
based on cause); Deborah A. Johnson Wilson, Prosecutorial Misuse of Peremptory
Challenges and the Sixth Amendment, 29 HOW. L.J. 481 (1986).
But see Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a
Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 8
(1990) (discussing the peremptory challenge in light of the legislative intent behind the
Thirteenth Amendment and asserting that "the Mhirteenth [A]mendment offers sub-
stantive protections against disqualification of African-American jurors through the
peremptory challenge").
59. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305-06; U.S. CONST. amends. VI &
XIV.
60. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
61. Id. at 203.
62. Id
although African American males over twenty-one constituted
twenty-six percent of the total male population over twenty-one, only
ten to fifteen percent of jury panelists were African Americans. 6 3
The Supreme Court found the contention meritless and ruled against
the defendant on this issue.64
Next, Mr. Swain contended that the prosecution had used its per-
emptory challenges in a discriminatory manner in an attempt to ex-
clude all African Americans from the jury panel.6 5 In deciding this
issue, the Supreme Court promulgated a test to be used in future
cases. The Court held that in order to sustain a charge of discrimina-
tory use of peremptory challenges, a defendant must demonstrate
that:
[Tihe prosecutor in a county, in case after case, whatever the circumstances,
whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim may be, is re-
sponsible for the removal of Negroes who have been selected as qualified ju-
rors by the jury commissioners and who have survived challenges for cause,
with the result that no Negroes ever serve on petit juries .... 66
Despite the fact that the prosecutor in Swain struck every African
American from the venire, the Court found that the defendant had
not demonstrated the requisite showing of discrimination to establish
a valid challenge.6 7
After Swain, many commentators were troubled by the restrictive
and harsh requirements the Court imposed on defendants attempt-
ing to establish an equal protection claim that peremptory challenges
had been used by the prosecutor in a discriminatory fashion.68 There
63. Id. at 205.
64. Id. at 206-09.
65. Id. at 209.
66. 1L at 223.
67. Ld. at 224-26.
68. JOHN E. NOWAK, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 521, 546 (3d abr. ed. 1986). See
also Frederick L. Brown, et al., The Peremptory Challenge as a Manipulative Device
in Criminal Trials: Traditional Use or Abuse, 14 NEw ENG. L. REv. 192 (1978) (Swain
standard exacts an overburdensome standard of review and thereby fails to remedy
prosecutorial abuses of the peremptory challenge system); Roger S. Kuhn, Jury Dis-
crimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 235 (1968) (Swain imposes insur-
mountable burden on defendant); Lisa Van Amburg, Comment, A Case Study of the
Peremptory Challenge: A Subtle Strike at Equal Protection and Due Process, 18 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 662 (1974); F.R.D., Comment, Swain v. Alabama: A Constitutional
Blueprintfor the Perpetuation of the All-hite Jury, 52 VA. L. REv. 1157 (1966) (argu-
ing that the Swain Court's deference to the peremptory challenge is responsible for
continued racism in the courtroom); Bradley S. Phillips, Note, Limiting the Peremp-
tory Challenge : Representation of Groups on Petit Juries, 86 YALE L.J. 1715 (1977)
(claiming that African Americans as a group do not sympathize with an African Amer-
ican defendant in a criminal trial, but the reason African American jurors may give
lighter sentences is their "understandable suspicion" of the workings of government).
One commentator found the Supreme Court's conclusion in Swain to be incredible,
especially in light of the fact that the Court "found no constitutional violation despite
the undisputed fact that no black had served on a jury in Tallegada County in fifteen
years." JORDAN, supra note 21, at 279. Many courts have also expressed their discon-
tent with the Swain standard. See, e.g., Booker v. Jabe, 775 F.2d 762, 767 (6th Cir.
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was a great deal of skepticism that such a harsh test could ever be
met, thus putting Fourteenth Amendment protection out of the
reach of most defendants. 69 However, from 1965 until 1986 Swain re-
mained valid law, and, as predicted, although numerous claims were
presented to the courts, virtually none were successful in challenging
the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.70
3. Batson v. Kentucky
In 1986, the Supreme Court, in Batson v. Kentucky, reconsidered
the issue of racial discrimination in the use of peremptory chal-
lenges.71 The Court concluded that the harsh Swain requirements
did not comport with equal protection rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 72 Thus, the Court overruled Swain in an attempt to
provide reasonable means of recourse to defendants who had been
convicted by juries selected by means of racially motivated peremp-
1985), vacated and remanded, McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1120-22 (2d Cir. 1984);
vacated on other grounds, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986); People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 766
(Cal. 1978); Michigan v. Booker, 478 U.S. 1001 (1985), opinion reinstated, Booker v.
Jabe, 801 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1046 (1987).
69. See Honorable George Bundy Smith, Swain v. Alabama: The Use of Peremp-
tory Challenges to Strike Blacks From Juries, 27 How. L. J. 1571 (1984).
70. Cases demonstrating unsuccessful Swain challenges include: United States v.
Delay, 500 F.2d 1360 (8th Cir. 1974); Little v. United States, 490 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 861 (1974); United States v. Pollard, 483 F.2d 929 (8th Cir. 1973)
cert denied, 414 U.S. 1137 (1974); United States v. Ming, 466 F.2d 1000 (7th Cir. 1972)
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 915 (1972); United States v. Carlton, 456 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Williams, 446 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1971); Brown v. Crouse, 425 F.2d 305
(10th Cir. 1970); Davis v. United States, 374 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1967). See Clara L. Meek,
The Use of Peremptory Challenges to Exclude Blacks from Petit Juries in Civil Ac-
tions: The Case for Striking Peremptory Strikes, 4 REV. LIT. 175, 182 n.31 (1985) (ex-
tensive list of cases in which defendants were unsuccessful in their attempt to meet
the Swain requirements); McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1120 (2d Cir. 1984) ("Not
surprisingly, almost no other defendants have met this standard of proof"); See Bruce
J. Winick, Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge Practices in Capital Cases: An Empiri-
cal Study and a Constitutional Analysis, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1, 13 (1982) (discussing
Swain in the context of a capital case and noting the difficulty of meeting the Swain
standard under those conditions). But see Jonathan B. Mintz, Batson v. Kentucky: A
Half Step in the Right Direction (Racial Discrimination and Peremptory Challenges
Under the Heavier Confines of Equal Protection), 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1026, 1031
(1987) (only two successful challenges in twenty-one years); James D. Pearson, Jr., An-
notation, Use of Peremptory Challenge to Exclude from Jury Persons Belonging to a
Class or Race, 79 A.L.R. 3D 14 (1977) (noting that only one state, Louisiana, has
granted new trials based on Swain challenges, and that even Louisiana has only
granted two such new trials; State v. Washington, 375 So. 2d 1162 (La. 1979) (successful
Swain challenge); State v. Brown, 371 So. 2d 751 (La. 1979) (same).
71. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
72. Batson, 476 U.S. at 80.
tory strikes.73
In Batson, the defendant had been convicted on two counts of sec-
ond degree burglary.74 He appealed his conviction, claiming that the
jury had been improperly impaneled due to the prosecution's dis-
criminatory use of peremptory challenges in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment.7 5 In reversing the defendant's conviction, the
Supreme Court promulgated a three-part prima facie test that a de-
fendant must satisfy in order to successfully challenge a prosecutor's
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.76
First, the defendant must show that she is a member of a cogniza-
ble racial group.77 The second part of the test allows a defendant to
rely on the fact that peremptory challenges permit "those to discrim-
inate who are of a mind to discriminate."78 Lastly, the defendant
must establish that the "facts [of the case] and any other relevant cir-
cumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice
to exclude the venire[persons] from the petit jury on account of their
race."79 After the defendant has made a prima facie showing, the
burden then shifts to the State to give a "neutral explanation" as to
why the venireperson was excluded.8 0 However, such an explanation
need not rise to the level of a "for cause" challenge.81 If the judge
accepts the explanation, then the defendant's prima facie case. is re-
butted.82 In the end, it is largely up to the trial court's broad discre-
tion to determine whether the prosecutor exhibited "purposeful
discrimination."83
Since its promulgation, the Batson test has undergone detailed
scrutiny,8 4 which has revealed that the three-part test can be boiled
down to a simple inquiry: whether the trial judge believes that the
prosecutor exercised his peremptory challenges in a discriminatory
fashion.85 Part one of the test, requiring a defendant to show that he
belongs to a cognizable racial group,86 appears to be a non-sequitur,
as virtually every person can trace his or her roots to some cogniza-
ble racial group.8 7 The second "requirement" does not appear to be a
73. Id, at 93.
74. 1& at 83.
75. 1& at 83-84.
76. AL at 96. See JoRDAN, supra note 21, at § 8.06.
77. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
78. Id. (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
79. Id,
80. Id, at 97.
81. ML
82. Md at 98. See also JoRDAN, supra note 21, at § 8.07.
83. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.
84. See JORDAN, supra note 21, at § 8.06.
85. See infra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
86. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
87. One possible problem with the Court's criterion is that it does not require a
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requirement at all. It merely directs the judge to take judicial notice
of the "arbitrary and capricious" nature of the peremptory
challenge.88
The last requirement of the defendant's prima facie case contains
the heart of the test. The judge must decide, in light of all of the evi-
dence, whether the prosecutor, in her peremptorial strike of a
venireperson, did in fact discriminate on the basis of race.89 Finally,
after considering all three prongs of this test, if the judge decides
that the prosecutor intentionally discriminated against members of
the venire, then the prosecutor must provide a neutral explanation
for striking the venireperson. 90 Once again, it is up to the judge to
decide whether the prosecutor's explanation is plausible.91 Thus, in
actuality, this five-step test boils down to one simple query: Does the
trial judge believe that the prosecutor used the peremptory challenge
in a discriminatory fashion?92,
4. Powers v. Ohio and Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.
The Supreme Court's most recent treatment of the issue of the dis-
criminatory use of peremptory challenges is delineated in two cases
which were decided within months of each other: Powers v. Ohio93
and Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.94 Interestingly, these cases
do not modify or clarify the Batson test. They merely expand the
availability of a Batson challenge.95 Thus, while the Court in Batson
allowed a criminal defendant to dispute a prosecutor's alleged dis-
criminatory use of peremptory challenges, 96 Powers and Edmonson
make the Batson challenge available to all litigants in the civil con-
text97 and to defendants in criminal cases where the excluded
defendant to show that she belongs to a cognizable minority group. Thus, it is feasible
that one could show that she is a full-blooded German, of Aryan descent, and thereby
satisfy the first part of the Batson test.
88. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
89. Id at 96-96. The judge may take into account the prosecutor's statements and
questions during voir dire as well as any pattern of strikes. Id
90. Id at 97.
91. Id at 98.
92. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
93. 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
94. 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
95. See Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2088-89 (private litigant in civil case may employ
Batson challenge); Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1370-74 (criminal defendant may use Batson
challenge whether or not she shares same race as excluded jurors.)
96. See supra notes 86-91.
97. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2077.
venireperson is of a different race than that of the defendant. 98
It is also worth noting that in neither Powers nor Edmonson did
the Supreme Court decide that the venireperson had actually been
wrongfully excluded from the jury.99 Rather, in both cases, because
the trial courts had improperly refused to consider a Batson chal-
lenge, the Supreme Court merely held that a trial judge must con-
sider a Batson challenge asserted by an attorney during voir dire,1oo
and must make a ruling in light of the particular circumstances.l 0 '
Where the trial judge refuses to make such a ruling, the defendant is
awarded a new trial.102 Accordingly, in both Powers and Edmonson,
the Supreme Court reversed the convictions and remanded the cases
for a new trial because the respective trial judges had refused to rule
on the Batson challenges.O3
III. THIRD PARTY STANDING
Article III of the United States Constitution states that any matter
brought before the courts must involve a case or controversy between
two parties.'0 4 Courts have interpreted this requirement to mean
98. Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1364.
99. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2088-89; Powers, 111 S. Ct. 1364.
100. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2088-89; Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1374.
101. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2088-89; Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1374.
102. Jordan, supra note 21, at 270.
103. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2089; Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1374.
104. U.S. CONST., art. III, Sect. 2. Article III, section 2, subsection 1, reads in its
entirety:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction;--to Controverises to which the United States shall be a Party;-
to Controversies between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens
of another State;--between Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of
the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between
a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
Id. But Article III, section 2, was limited by the Eleventh Amendment, which states:
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend.
XI. For a discussion concerning the injury-in-fact requirement, see Tushnet, The Soci-
ology of Article III= A Response to Professor Brilmayer, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1698 (1980)
(discussing the problem of injury-in-fact in cases involving constitutional harm and ar-
guing that there is no cognizable difference between plaintiffs alleging ideological in-
jury and those alleging personal injury, and thus, both should have standing).
Professor Tushnet also pointed out how the "entire concept of standing is awfully
prone to manipulation and incoherence" given the inconsistency of the law. Id. at 1715
n.72; see also Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-
Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033 (1968) (asserting that rec-
ognition of standing "is not necessarily equivalent to recognition of a right." Thus,
courts are not restricted by a requirement of a plaintiff with a direct injury-in-fact);
Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement?,
78 YALE L.J. 816, 840 (1969) (arguing that there is no historical authority for the propo-
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that a party must have a "sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable
controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy ...."105
Normally, in an attempt to conserve judicial resources, courts nar-
rowly interpret the "injury-in-fact" requirement. 0 6 Nonetheless, for
public policy reasons, courts have looked to prudential considera-
tions 07 to occasionally allow a broader interpretation of the standing
requirements.]0 8 Thus, where a taxpayer can show that a certain
spending measure violates a specific provision of the Constitution,
that taxpayer will have standing to challenge the measure.109 As a
general rule, however, the courts have rejected any unnecessary
broadening of the standing rules."i0
In addition to occasionally expanding the rules of standing, courts
have established outright exceptions to the traditional standing re-
quirements."' One such exception, third party standing, 1 2 provides
sition that "the Constitution demands injury to a personal interest as a prerequisite to
attacks on allegedly unconstitutional action").
105. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731 (1972). See generally CHARLES A.
WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 13, at 60 (4th ed. 1983); Louis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE AcTION 459 (abr. student ed. 1965). One commentator
has described the injury-in-fact requirement as follows: "In theory, a litigant must now
demonstrate, regardless of the actual existence of a claimed injury or its subjective im-
portance, an individuated harm impacting specifically upon him and of a tangible, con-
crete nature." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 3-16, at 114 (2d ed. 1988)
[hereinafter TRIBE].
106. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (no standing for parents of
black children attending public schools to challenge alleged discriminatory tax exemp-
tions to private schools); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Sepa-
ration of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1982) (no standing for federal
taxpayers challenging grant by Housing, Education and Welfare Department to Chris-
tian college); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976) (physicians who alleged economic
injury from state abortion statute found to have standing); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 499-501 (1975) (no standing for litigants challenging zoning law because litigants
had never been denied a variance or a permit by zoning board).
107. See TRIBE spra note 105, at §§ 3-14, 3-19.
108. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977) (standing for minority potential homebuyer excluded from opportunity to
purchase home); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (federal taxpayer standing to chal-
lenge constitutionality of tax).
109. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (federal taxpayer standing to challenge con-
stitutionality of federal spending program); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936)
(federal taxpayer accorded standing to challenge federal agricultural commodity
processing tax.)
110. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (no
standing to challenge the practice of House members serving in Armed Forces Re-
serve); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (no standing granted to citizen
challenging statute allowing director of CIA to certify expenditures as opposed to pro-
viding a regular accounting of funds as required under the Constitution at article I,
section 9, clause 7.)
111. TRIBE, supra note 105, at § 3-19.
standing to those who are not themselves sufficiently injured, but
who have been sufficiently connected to a situation in which injured
third parties are not motivated to litigate their own rights in court.113
The test for third party standing was set out in Singleton v. Wuzff. 114
In Singleton, the Supreme Court determined that a litigant may have
standing to litigate the rights of a third party where: 1) the litigant
himself has suffered "injury-in-fact,""5 2) the litigant enjoys a close
relation to the third party,li6 and 3) the third party is unable or un-
likely to protect his own interests." 7
A. Third Party Standing in Powers v. Ohio
1. Injury-in-fact
As explained above, courts have narrowly construed "injury-in-
fact" in order to conserve judicial resources,1' 8 to adhere to a strict
reading of the Constitution," 9 and to avoid rendering advisory opin-
ions. 120 The courts have held that potential jail time,' 2 ' economic
loss,' 22 and physical injury123 each constitute injury-in-fact. More-
112. See generally Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
277 (1984) (discussing third party standing).
113. See id.; Marc Rohr, Fighting for the Rights of Others: The Troubled Law of
Third-Party Standing and Mootness in the Federal Courts, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 393
(1981) (Professor Rohr expounds on the rule of third party standing with special atten-
tion to to justification in light of the Supreme Court's decisions on mootness in class
actions); Robert A. Sedler, The Assertion of Constitutional Jus Tertii: A Substantive
Approach, 70 CAL. L. REv. 1308 (1982) (tracing the history and current treatment of
the rule of third party standing in the courts and advocating the removal of third party
standing from constitutional litigation).
114. 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
115. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 112 (describing injury-in-fact as a "sufficiently concrete
interest in the outcome of theO case to make it a case or controversy subject to a fed-
eral court's Art. III jurisdiction").
116. Iti at 114-15.
117. Id. at 115-16.
118. See supra note 106.
119. TRIBE, supra note 105, at §§ 3-9, 3-14, 3-15.
120. Id. at §§ 3-9, 3-14.
121. For example, in Griswold v. Connecticut, the physician plaintiff had given his
patients birth control information and prescriptions in violation of a federal statute.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480-81 (1965). The doctor was litigating in order
to avoid a jail sentence. As an integral part of his defense, the doctor chose to litigate
his patients' right to privacy. The Court held that the doctor's injury of potential jail
time was "injury in fact." Id.
Similary, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, the appellant, a distributor of contraceptive infor-
mation, in an attempt to stay out of jail, chose to litigate the right of single people to
have access to birth control. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 440 (1972). The Court
again held that potential jail time was injury-in-fact. Id. at 446. See also Doe v. Bol-
ton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (potential criminal prosecution constitutes injury-in-fact).
122. In Craig v. Boren, the plaintiff suffered economic loss, an injury which the
Court recognized as injury-in-fact. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). See also Associ-
ation of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Hardin v. Ken-
tucky Utils. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (plaintiff
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over, where a plaintiff has been illegally discriminated against 12 4 or
wrongfully deprived of liberty,125 courts occasionally find sufficient
injury-in-fact.126
With these principles in mind, Justice Kennedy, writing the major-
ity opinion in Powers v. Ohio,127 held that the defendant had suffered
the requisite injury-in-fact, justifying application of the third party
standing doctrine.128 In Powers, the appellant, a Caucasian defendant
in a criminal prosecution, claimed that he had been injured in fact
because an African American venireperson had been excluded from
the jury by the prosecutor's alleged discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges.129 The Court held that the defendant had been injured
because "racial discrimination in the selection of jurors... places the
fairness of a criminal proceeding in doubt.., and so invites cynicism
respecting the jury's neutrality and its obligation to adhere to the
law."130 Justice Kennedy also expressed his concern that the dis-
criminatory use of peremptory challenges calls into question the in-
tegrity of the entire criminal proceeding.131
However, Justice Scalia, who dissented in Powers, commented that
never before had the Supreme Court addressed the issue of injury-in-
fact in such generalities and perceptions of injustice.132 He pointed
out that the majority never claimed that the individual defendant
suffered any injury as a result of a biased jury. 3 3 Justice Scalia then
directed attention to Holland v. Illinois,3 4 a case decided in 1990 in
which he wrote the majority opinion.135 In Holland, the Court held
who sold his house to an African American in violation of neighborhood restrictive
covenant was faced with $10,000 breach of contract claim).
123. See 13 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
JUR.2D, § 3531.4 (1984 & Supp. 1991).
124. TRIBE, supra note 105, at § 3-16, p. 119.
125. Id at § 3-16.
126. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
262 (1977) (standing upon "show[ing] an injury to itself that is 'likely to be redressed
by a favorable decision.' ")(quoting Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976)); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 205
(1972) (legislative definition conferred standing when allegation of injury "by a dis-
criminatory housing practice.")
127. 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
128. Powers, at 1372-73.
129. Id at 1366.
130. Id. at 1371 (citations omitted).
131. Id
132. Id. at 1378-80 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
133. Id at 1379 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
134. 493 U.S. 474 (1990).
135. Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1379 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
that "a prohibition upon the exclusion of cognizable groups through
peremptory challenges.. .would undermine rather than further.. .the
[defendant's] right to trial by 'an impartial jury.' "13 Justice Scalia
also asserted that as recent as the Court's previous term, the same
Court had suggested that "in some circumstances [such exclusions]
may increase fairness."137 Scalia concluded his discussion on this
point by noting that he was "unmoved" by Mr. Powers' complaint
that the removal of an African American from the jury prejudiced
Mr. Powers, a Caucasian.138
In Powers, the majority broadened the traditional notion of injury-
in-fact in the third party standing arena by holding that a specific
criminal defendant sustains an "injury-in-fact" where the general
public may perceive the atmosphere of the criminal proceeding to be
unfair.139 Interestingly, the Court never addressed the issue of
whether the questionable use of peremptory challenges placed doubt
concerning the fairness of the proceeding into the mind of this appel-
lant, in this case. Moreover, the dissent challenged the majority's
definition of "injury-in-fact," and argued that Mr. Powers never
demonstrated that he himself had sustained the requisite personal in-
jury sufficient to establish third party standing.140
2. Relationship Between the Parties
The second requirement of third party standing is the existence of
a close relationship between the third party and the litigant.141 Tra-
ditionally, only recognized confidential relationships142 or certain fi-
nancial relationships143 have satisfied the standard for a third party
standing relationship.144 Only in very limited circumstances has the
Court departed from its traditional rulings and granted third party
136. Holland, 493 U.S. at 474.
137. Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1379 (Scalia, J., dissenting)(emphasis added).
138. Id. at 1381 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 1371.
140. Id. at 1379 (Scalia, J., dissenting.)
141. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114-15 (1976) (third party standing exception
applicable if third party has relationship with right-holder such that third party will be
effective proponent with real interest).
142. For example, in Griswold v. Connecticut, a doctor was allowed to litigate the
rights of his patients because the Court deemed the doctor-patient relationship to be
close enough to satisfy the doctrine of third party standing, in part because the doctor
was convicted of a crime for providing patients with contraceptives. Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965). See generally William W. Van Alstyne, Closing the
Circle of Constitutional Review From Griswold v. Connecticut to Roe v. Wade: An Out-
line of a Decision Merely Overruling Roe, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1677 (1989). Moreover, in
United States Dept of Labor v. Triplett, the attorney-client relationship was held to be
a close enough relationship to allow an attorney to litigate the due process rights of his
client. United States Dep't of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 720-21 (1990).
143. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (distributor-distributee relationship).
144. See generally TRIBE, supra note 105, at § 3-19.
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standing to a'litigant whose relationship to the third party was more
distant.145
In light of this precedent, the Court in Powers evaluated the rela-
tionship between a criminal defendant and a person on the venire. 146
Justice Kennedy once again stepped outside traditional precedential
boundaries by holding that the venireperson-defendant relationship
is within the confines of the third party standing doctrine. 147 Curi-
ously, the Court's analysis of this point was relatively scant.148
Rather than squarely addressing the actual relationship between the
defendant and the venireperson, Justice Kennedy focused on com-
mon interests that the defendant and the venireperson shared.149
The Court ruled that because a defendant and an excluded venireper-
son have a common interest in eliminating racial discrimination from
the courtroom, 5 0 they therefore have the requisite relationship for
the defendant, to litigate the interests of the excluded venireperson
under the third party standing doctrine.' 5 ' The Court explained this
common interest by describing in detail the interests of both the
venireperson and the defendant in the fairness of the proceeding.15 2
Justice Kennedy's reasoning appears to circumvent the relation-
ship requirement. The Court argued that a relationship exists be-
tween a defendant and a venireperson merely because of the
existence of a commonality of interests. 15 3 However, the presence of
the shared interest in the fairness of a court proceeding does not
seem to rise to the level of a precedentially recognized close
relationship.
Furthermore, the Court did not elaborate on the actual relation-
ship existing between Mr. Powers and any excluded venireperson.
While it is true that at one point the majority did speak of a "bond of
145. For example, in Craig, the Court held that a distributor-distributee relation-
ship withstood third party standing scrutiny. Craig, 429 U.S. at 190. See also United
States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973) (an association or organization may litigate the
rights of its members); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (private school
may litigate the due process rights of its students and their parents when unconstitu-
tional law, as applied to parents, threatens association's property or business); see gen-
erally TRIBE, supra note 105, at 137-39.
146. Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1372 (1991).
147. Id. at 1373.
148. See id& at 1372.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1372.
152. Id.
153. Id
trust" between a defendant and a juror,154 it was not asserted that
this same bond of trust existed between the defendant and an ex-
cluded venireperson.l55 Thus, in order to satisfy the "relationship"
requirement of the third party standing doctrine, the Court now re-
quires only that the litigant and the third party have a "common in-
terest."''1 In this case, the "common interest" was ridding the
courtroom of discrimination.157 However, the ambiguity in the
phrase "common interest" could lay the foundation for a further ex-
pansion of third party standing.
3. Inability or Unlikelihood of Third Parties To Defend Their
Rights
Historically, the Supreme Court has held that a litigant may liti-
gate the rights of a third party where the third party is unable or un-
likely to litigate their own rights. 158 In Barrows v. Jackson,159 the
Court addressed the issue of third party standing where a third party
was unable to defend his or her rights.160 Additionally, the Supreme
Court held in Singleton v. WuUf,161 that where a third party is
merely unlikely to litigate his rights, under certain circumstances a
separate party may litigate those rights before the court. 6 2
154. I&
155. See id. This may have been an oversight on the majority's part, but it is signif-
icant in demonstrating the ambiguity surrounding the majority's position on the third
party standing issue.
156. Id It is conceivable that a completely disinterested person who chose to ob-
serve a trial would also share the common interest in the perceived fairness of the
proceedings.
157. Id.
158. See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
159. 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
160. Id. at 257. In Barrows, the defendant had sold his house to an African Ameri-
can in violation of a restrictive covenant which the defendant had previously signed.
Id, at 252. The covenant prohibited any person in the neighborhood from selling his
house to an African American. Id. at 251-52. When the defendant violated the cove-
nant, members of the homeowners association sued him for breach of covenant. Id.
The defendant claimed that the covenant was invalid as a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. at 253. However, the defendant did
not claim that the covenant had violated his own rights, but that the rights violated
were those of the potential African American homebuyers. Id. at 254-55. The Court
held that because it would be very difficult for potential African American
homebuyers to assert their rights, in this situation the defendant could litigate those
rights under the doctrine of third party standing. Id. at 258-59.
161. 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
162. Id. at 116-17. In Singleton, a doctor challenged a state statute denying his pa-
tient Medicaid benefits for an abortion, claiming that the statute violated his patient's
rights under Roe v. Wade. Id. at 110. A plurality of the Court ruled that a litigant
need not establish that it would be impossible for the third party to litigate their
rights, but merely that there exists a "genuine obstacle," preventing the third party
from asserting their rights in court. Id. at 116 n.6. The Court reasoned that because a
woman's need for privacy is a "genuine obstacle," precluding her from asserting her
rights in court, her doctor may assert those rights as a third party litigant. Id. at 117.
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In Powers v. Ohio,163 the Court pointed out numerous barriers
preventing a venireperson wrongfully excluded from a jury from as-
serting his rights. 64 The Court held that these barriers satisfied the
third prong of the third party standing test.165 Justice Kennedy rea-
soned that a venireperson, who has no opportunity to be heard at the
time of his exclusion, would have a difficult time proving that the
prosecutor discriminated against him.166 Further, the small financial
amount at stake, coupled with the economic burden of litigation, pro-
vides a venireperson with little incentive to bring suit.16 7 Moreover,
an effort to obtain declaratory or injunctive relief would probably be
futile, given that discrimination against this specific venireperson
during voir dire would be very unlikely to recur.168 Accordingly, be-
cause it is highly unlikely that a venireperson would bring, let alone
win, a suit,169 the Court held that these barriers satisfy this require-
ment of third party standing.170
B. Third Party Standing in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.
In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,171 a civil case, the appellant
asserted that the opposing counsel's use of peremptory challenges
was racially discriminatory.172 In dealing with this third party stand-
ing issue, Justice Kennedy, again writing for the majority, incorpo-
rated by reference his reasoning in Powers.173 He drew little
distinction between the civil and criminal context when analyzing
the relationship between a defendant and an excluded venireperson
and the injuries sustained by both.174 The only cognizable difference
concerned injury-in-fact to the litigant75 While in a criminal con-
text the complainant would be in danger of criminal prosecution, the
litigant in a civil trial would be in danger of pecuniary loss.176 How-
ever, because both of these injuries constitute judicially recognized
163. 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
164. Powers, 111 S.Ct. at 1373.
165. Id at 1373.
166. Id
167. I&
168. I&
169. ML
170. Id
171. 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
172. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2081.
173. Id, at 2087.
174. Id at 2087-88.
175. Id, at 2083.
176. Id.
injury-in-fact, the Court ruled that the civil litigant had standing to
litigate the rights of the excluded venireperson.177
Thus, in Powers and Edmonson, the Court effected substantial
change in the law concerning third party standing. As the law stands
now, not only does a defendant who perceives the trial as unfair suf-
fer the requisite injury-in-fact, a litigant now need only allege some
"common interest" shared with the third party in order to satisfy the
relationship requirement of the doctrine.178
IV. STATE ACTIoN
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
section 1, proclaims: "No State shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."'179 This passage, com-
monly referred to as the equal protection clause, provides citizens
protection against state sponsored discrimination. 8 0 This passage
does not, however, provide protection against discrimination by pri-
vate parties.'B' As Justice Bradley stated in the Civil Rights Cases:'8 2
"Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject matter of
the [Fourteenth] Amendment." 83
In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court struck down federal legislation
prohibiting private owners of inns, theaters, and others places of pub-
lic accommodation from denying access and service on the basis of
race.'8 4 The Court reasoned that (1) the Fourteenth Amendment ap-
plies only to state action,' 85 (2) section five of the amendment does
not empower Congress to pass anti-discrimination laws proscribing
private conduct, but only allows Congress to pass laws preventing the
states from prohibiting the exercise of Fourteenth Amendment
rights,186 and (3) the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slav-
ery, is not broad enough to cover private discrimination.' 8 7
The Civil Rights Cases created the doctrine of "state action," 8 8
177. Id,
178. Consequently, as this type of injury is now recognized pursuant to the estab-
lishment of third party standing, there is no reason why any party attempting to pro-
cure first party standing may not allege that he has been injured by perceiving
government activity as being unfair.
179. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
180. Id.
181. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
182. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
183. Id. at 11.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 21-22. See generally Arthur Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of Negro
Freedom, 21 RUTGERS L. REv. 387 (1967) (discussing the courts' failure to delineate the
substantive rights of wartime acts, such as the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts).
188. For a discussion of the purposes of the state action doctrine, see TRIBE, supra
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which has been a key factor in shaping equal protection jurispru-
dence. Over the past forty-three years, the Supreme Court has de-
cided a myriad of cases dealing with state action,18 9 beginning with
Shelley v. Kramer, 190 and leading up to the Court's recent decision in
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. 191 Although the equal protection
clause has been interpreted as proscribing only discriminatory state
action, and not private acts of discrimination, the dividing line be-
tween the two has become blurry at best.192 In the words of Justice
O'Connor in her dissent in Edmonson, this line of cases has "not been
a model of consistency."193
The incongruity of Supreme Court decisions concerning state ac-
tion can be traced back to the beliefs and legal philosophies of a
handful of Chief Justices who provided leadership in the interpreta-
tion and application of equal protection principles. 194 For example,
note 105, at § 18-2, The Problem of State Action (2d ed. 1988). See generally H.
FRIENDLY, THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE AND THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE PENUMBRA 13
(1968).
189. See generally, Hala Ayoub, Comment, The State Action Doctrine in State and
Federal Courts, 11 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 893 (1984) (discussing the symbiotic relationship
test); Anthony Thompson, Piercing the Veil of State Action The Revisionist Theory
and a Mythical Application to Self-Help Repossession, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 1, 22-23, 79
(state action doctrine in general).
190. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
191. 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991). See also Ira Nerken, A New Deal for the Protection of
Fourteenth Amendment Rights: Challenging the Doctrinal Bases of the Civil Rights
Cases and State Action Theory, 12 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297, 363 (1977) (discussing
the development of the state action doctrine in the nineteenth century and asserting
that the "problems of the irresponsible use of private power escape constitutional
scrutiny").
192. See generally, Frederick F. Schauer, Hudgens v. NLRB and the Problem of
State Action in First Amendment Adjudication, 61 MINN. L. REV. 433 (1977); David S.
Elkind, Note, State Action: Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Pri-
vate Activity, 74 COLuM. L. REV. 656 (1974).
193. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2089 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Another commenta-
tor, Professor Charles Black, characterized the condition of state action law as "a con-
ceptual disaster area." Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Cour4 1966 Term -
Forewor& 'State Action,' Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV.
L. REV. 69, 95 (1967). See also Christopher D. Stone, Corporate Vices and Corporate
Virtues: Do Public/Private Distinctions Matter?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1441, 1484 n.156
(1982) (stating that "the whole state action area appears now, more than ever, a
shambles").
194. See generally Henry C. Strickland, The State Action Doctrine and the Rehn-
quist Court, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 587 (1991) (giving a comprehensive history of the
state action doctrine including the trends of previous courts and the individual state
action "models" followed by current Supreme Court members); Kevin L. Cole, Federal
and State "State Action": The Undercritical Embrace of a Hypercriticized Doctrine, 24
GA. L. REV. 327, 329 (1990) (exploring both the federal and state state-action doctrines
and asserting that "structural differences between federal and state governments can
drain federal constitutional doctrine of its utility when that doctrine is incorporated
during the years of the Warren Court, those eager to find state action
harnessed the most votes,195 and, consequently, of six major cases de-
cided by the Warren Court, state action was found in all six.196 Dur-
ing these years, the Court began to bypass the question of whether
the state was the actor and to proceed right to the issue of whether
the right was violated,197 despite the fact that state action is required
for the application of the Fourteenth Amendment.198 Thus, because
the Court was so ready to assign state action to the most nominal pri-
vate action, commentators began to speak of the "twilight of state
action."199
In recent Supreme Court decisions, however, the state action doc-
trine has returned "with a vengeance," 20 0 gaining more than enough
votes to become firmly embedded in case law.20 ' Consequently, of
into state constitutional law"); Recent Development- Fourteenth Amendment - State
Action - Seventh Circuit Recognizes a Broader State Duty to AcL - Ross V. United
States 910 F.2d 1422 (7th Cir. 1990), 104 HARV. L. REv. 1147 (1991); Erwin Chemerin-
sky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 503 (1985) (tracing the expansion of
the state action doctrine throughout the Vinson and Warren courts, and the doctrine's
subsequent decline in the Burger and Rehnquist courts). Professor Chemerinsky also
argues for the abolition of the entire doctrine because "[i]t requires courts to refrain
from applying constitutional values to private disputes even though there is no other
form of effective redress." Id. at 507. He believes it is inequitable to protect against
government abuse, but not comparable private abuse. Id. at 519-27.
195. For example, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), decided by the Warren
court, began a long line of state action cases sympathetic to the victims of private dis-
crimination. Several commentators were skeptical of the Shelley's underlying ration-
ale. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARv. L. REV. 1, 29-31 (1959). However, there was considerable debate on the issue.
See, e.g., Louis H. Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to
Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1959); Louis Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer:
Notes For a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (1962).
196. Amalgamated Food Wmp. Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391
U.S. 308 (1968); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296
(1966); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963); Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
197. J. BARRON & C. DIENES, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL 349 (1986)
[hereinafter BARRON]. One commentator has noted, "During the Warren years, the
Court seemed so willing to find state action in nominally private conduct that com-
mentators began to speak of the twilight of the state action doctrine. It seemed as if
the doctrine was being merged into the issue of whether the right was violated rather
than serving as a threshold issue of whether the constitutional right was even impli-
cated." Id. Accordingly, several commentators were hopeful that the Warren Court
would provide the demise of the state action doctrine altogether. For example, one
commentator stated, "[W]hen it is realized that we have entered the time of the twi-
light of state action, the Court is revealed as perhaps beginning the construction of the
new and sensible road of evaluating the constitutional issue concerning discrimination
on the merits rather than letting the accident of state action make the determination."
Jerre S. Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEx. L. REv. 347, 382 (1963).
198. The Fourteenth Amendment states in pertinent part: "[Nior shall any State
... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV (emphasis added).
199. Williams, supra note 197, at 347.
200. BARRON, supra note 197, at 349.
201. See infra note 202.
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eleven cases decided by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, state ac-
tion was only found in three.2 02 Ironically, the Rehnquist Court
broke with this precedent in Edmonson and decided that a civil liti-
gant is a state actor when exercising peremptory challenges. 203 The
Chief Justice did, however, join in Justice O'Connor's dissent.20 4
A. Three Interpretations of The State Action Doctrine
The majority in Edmonson, led by Justice Kennedy, began its anal-
ysis by recognizing the two-part test, enumerated in Lugar v. Ed-
mondson Oil Co.,205 used in determining whether state action
exists.206 The! first part of the Lugar test requires that a "claimed
constitutional deprivation result from the exercise of a right or priv-
ilege having its source in state authority."20 7 The Court found this
requirement to be satisfied.208 Next, the Court turned to the second
part of the Lugar test, namely, "whether the private party charged
with the deprivation could be described in all fairness as a state ac-
tor."209 The Court acknowledged three tests to which courts turn in
202. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988) (no state
action); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (no state action); Lugar v. Edmonson Oil
Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982) (state action found); Randall-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830
(1982) (no state action); Flagg Bros., Inc., v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (no state ac-
tion); Hudgens v. N.L.R.B., 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (no state action); Jackson v. Metropoli-
tan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (no state action); Gilmore v. City of Montgomery,
417 U.S. 556 (1974) (state action found); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (state
action); Moose L)dge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (no state action); Evans v.
Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970) (no state action).
203. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2086.
204. Id. at 2089 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
205. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
206. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2082-87.
207. Id. at 2082-83.
208. Id. at 2083. The first part of the Lugar test is satisfied when it is shown that
the peremptory challenge has its source in state authority. Id. It is not contested that
this requirement is satisfied in this case. Clearly, although there is no constitutional
right to a peremptory challenge, counsel's right to use such challenges is firmly em-
bedded in case law and statutory authority. Id.; see also supra note 35 and accompany-
ing text.
209. Id. When the Court analyzed the second part of the Lugar test, the Court re-
ferred to the "peremptory challenge system" and the "jury trial system" as having
their source in state authority. The Court used these arguments in an attempt to sat-
isfy the first and second factors involved in the second part of the Lugar test, namely,
(1) whether the government significantly participated in the action, and (2) whether
the action is a traditional state function. However, in doing so, the Court merely reit-
erated its "source in state authority" arguments to demonstrate that the requirements
for the second part of the Lugar test were satisfied. Thus, in effect, it seems that the
Court bypassed the heart of the second part of the test: Did the individual's actions in
the present case constitute state action?
deciding whether a party is a state actor: (1) whether the government
provided "overt, significant participation," 21o (2) whether the litigant
was performing a traditional governmental function,21 ' and (3)
whether the injury to the excluded venireperson was "aggravated in
a unique way by the incidence of governmental authority."21 2 The
majority held that the facts in Edmonson justified a finding of state
action under any of the three tests.213 Accordingly, the Court found
that a private civil litigant is a state actor when exercising a peremp-
tory challenge.2 14 The following discussion examines the Court's
analysis of these three tests. This comment takes the position that
the Court should not consider a private civil litigant who exercises a
peremptory challenge to be a state actor.
B. Participation of the Government
1. Majority Opinion in Edmonson
Where the government has been involved in discriminatory action,
courts have examined whether the government's participation was
significant enough to constitute "state action" under the Fourteenth
Amendment, thereby implicating equal protection safeguards.215 In
discussing "government participation," the Edmonson majority fo-
cused on the peremptory challenge system as a whole. Justice Ken-
nedy argued that without significant government participation, "the
peremptory challenge system, as well as the jury trial system of
which it is a part, simply could not exist."21 6 The Court recited the
extensive governmental administrative procedures used in assem-
bling a venire, including the utilization of government courtrooms
and personnel.2 1 7 Moreover, the Court noted that the judge, a gov-
ernment employee, is the one who excuses the excluded venireper-
son.2 18 Because of this governmental participation, the Edmonson
majority concluded that the government had overtly and significantly
participated in the exercise of peremptory challenges.219
210. Id. at 2083-85.
211. Id. at 2083, 2086-87.
212. Id. at 2083, 2087.
213. Id. at 2083.
214. Id. at 2086-87.
215. For a compilation of the early cases dealing with this issue, see James D. Bar-
nett, What is "State" Action Under the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth Amend-
ments of the Constitution?, 24 OR. L. REV. 227 (1945).
216. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2084.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 2084-85.
219. Id. at 2085. It is helpful to note that while the majority cited to five cases in its
arguments, it performed little factual analysis. The Court cited Lugar v. Edmonson
Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982), and Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969),
to state the general rule, and then referred to three other cases for general authority.
The Court referred to Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880), for the proposition that
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In determining whether "state action" exists, it is helpful to clarify
exactly what "action" is being scrutinized. In Edmonson, the action
was a private attorney's exercise of a peremptory challenge. How-
ever, instead of focusing on this specific act, the majority's analysis
concentrated on the "peremptory challenge system" and the "jury
system" as a whole.220 The Court argued that because the state es-
tablishes and administers these systems,221 any person, who by
means of the system achieves discriminatory ends, is a state actor.222
Justice Kennedy's discourse on the theory behind the jury system
and peremptory challenge schemata does not seem helpful in an
analysis of the specific issues involved. According to the majority's
analysis, one could argue that every action a private citizen takes is
state action because the private citizen acted within a constitutionally
established society which is governed by laws instituted and enforced
by the government. 223 In one sense, it is true that without "govern-
ment" activity peremptory challenges would not exist, and, therefore,
a judge's excusal of a juror constitutes a "final and practical denial" of the juror's con-
stitutional rights. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2085. However, Rives is distinguishable
from Edmonson. In Rives, the "final and practical denial" of the defendants' rights
was the court's refusal to allow the African American defendants, accused of slaying a
caucasian male, to remove their case from state court to federal court, in order to ob-
tain a fair trial. Rives, 100 U.S. 315. In contrast, the judge in Edmonson merely ad-
vised a juror that he had been excused after a private attorney exercised a peremptory
challenge. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2085. Furthermore, in Rives, the judge was the one
exercising his discretion on a point of law: the removability of the case. This is inappo-
site to Edmonson, where the private attorney was the person exercising a peremptory
challenge, and that choice did not pertain to a point of law. It is reasonable that the
judge's ruling in Hives on a point of law constituted a "final and practical denial" of
the litigants' rights. Yet, this denial of rights is less clear when a judge merely advises
a juror that a litigant has exercised his right to a peremptory challenge, as in Edmon-
son.
Next, the Court cited to Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961),
for the proposition that by excusing the juror, the Court has elected to "place its
power, property and prestige behind the [alleged] discrimination." Edmonson, 111 S.
Ct. at 2085. Finally, the Court appealed to the reasoning in National Collegiate Ath-
letic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988), as supporting the assertion that in the
area of peremptories, the Court "'create[d] the legal framework governing the [chal-
lenged] conduct."' Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2085.
220. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2083.
221. 1d at 2083-85.
222. Id, at 2085-87.
223. The Court argued that "Congress has established the qualifications for jury
service. .. " and that the peremptory challenge system "could not exist" without the
"significant pariticipation of the government." Id. at 2084 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1865 (1966
& Supp. 1991)). The Court then listed fifteen statutes used for the establishment and
regulation of jury selection. Id,
could not be used in a discriminatory manner. But that analysis ap-
pears to miss the point. As Justice O'Connor stated in her dissent:
That these actions may be necessary to a peremptory challenge- in the sense
that there could be no such challenge without a venire from which to select-
no more makes the challenge state action than the building of roads and pro-
vision of public transportation make state action of riding on a bus.2 2 4
Moreover, in deciding whether the government "significantly par-
ticipated" in the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, it is
important to determine the extent of the government's role in the ac-
tion taken. As pointed out in Justice O'Connor's dissent, the govern-
ment's role in Edmonson was limited to that of advising the
venireperson that the private attorney had excluded her from the
jury.225 Framing the issue in that way, the question becomes
whether that specific governmental act constitutes "significant partic-
ipation of the government." 226
The Supreme Court in Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co.227 and Burton v.
Wilmington Banking Authority228 discussed this very issue of what
constitutes significant participation of the government. In Lugar, the
plaintiff alleged that a state statute providing for a writ of attach-
ment contained procedures which violated due process.229 Because
the sheriff, a state employee, executed the writ, the Court found
state action. 23 0 The Court reasoned that the allegedly defective pro-
cedural requirement combined with the sheriff's conduct constituted
"state action." 231
Moreover, in Burton, a restaurant owner leased space in a govern-
ment building and then refused to serve African Americans. 232
Those who ate at the restaurant parked in the adjacent state-owned
parking lot; thus, the state profited from the discriminatory practices
of the restaurant.233 The Court held that the restaurant owner was a
224. Id. at 2090 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
225. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
226. Id. at 2089 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
227. Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
228. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
229. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 925.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 941-42.
232. Burton, 365 U.S. at 719-20.
233. Id. at 724-25. See generally, Larry W. Yackle, The Burger Court, "State Ac-
tion," and Congressional Enactment of the Civil War Amendments, 27 ALA. L. REV.
479 (1975); Jerre S. Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEx. L. REV. 347, 382
(1963) (arguing that Burton permits the abdication of the state action doctrine when
discussing the discrimination issue). Theodore J. St. Antione, Color Blindness But Not
Myopia: A New Look at State Action, Equal Protection and "Private" Racial Discrimi-
nation, 59 MICH. L. REV. 993, 1005-06 (1961) (asserting that private conduct which is
condoned, but not required, by state law should be considered state action, and calling
the Burton decision "a model of circumspection if not irresolution"); Thomas P. Lewis,
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority - A Case Without Precedent, 61 COLUM. L.
REV. 1458 (1961).
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state actor because of the perceived symbiotic relationship between
the owner and the state parking authority.2 34
In its state action analysis in Edmonson, the majority argued that
the judge's dismissal of the venireperson resulted from an exercise of
the state's coercive power. The existence of state action in Edmonson
is analogous to the situations in both Lugar and Burton. In Lugar,
the state acted through the sheriff in executing the writ, and in Bur-
ton, the state benefitted by the discriminatory actions of the restau-
rant owner. Similarly, in Edmonson, the state acted through the
judge in excluding a venireperson. Because the judge's act played a
part in the dismissal of the venireperson, there can be no doubt that
there was some government participation.
However, the Edmonson Court apparently never came to terms
with the degree of government participation required to satisfy the
state action doctrine. In Blum v. Yaretsky,23 5 the Supreme Court
held that the government "normally can be held responsible for a
private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has
provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that
the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State."' 6 Thus,
the test not only contains a quantitative requirement that the State
exercise coercive power, but also includes a qualitative component
that the "choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State."237
The facts in Edmonson do not appear to satisfy this second require-
ment. In Edmonson, the choice to exclude the juror was not made by
the judge, it was made by counsel. 238 Therefore, it is difficult to
classify that choice as being made by the State when it was not the
judge's decision. to make.23 9
It is argued that by neutrally allowing private discrimination in a
private counsel's exercise of peremptory challenges, the Court, in ef-
fect, participated in the discrimination by allowing it to happen.240
This raises the issue of the degree of government participation re-
quired to satisfy the state action doctrine.
234. I& at 725.
235. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
236. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004 (emphasis added).
237. Id (emphasis added).
238. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2081.
239. Id
240. Id. at 2090 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
2. Justice O'Connor's Dissenting Opinion in Edmonson
In her dissent in Edmonson, Justice O'Connor addressed the issue
of the requisite degree of government participation and found no
state action.241 Justice O'Connor approached this problem by view-
ing the events at issue as two "actions." First, the private attorney
peremptorially struck a venireperson. Then, the trial judge, by ex-
cusing the juror, enforced the private action with the coercive power
of the state.2= Thus, two actions took place: an act by the private lit-
igant, and an act by the judge. Clearly, the private attorney's exer-
cise of choice was not in and of itself state action.243 On the other
hand, the judge's act, when evaluated independently, was unquestion-
ably state action.244
Thus, the issue becomes whether an attorney's exercise of a per-
emptory challenge becomes state action when evaluated in conjunc-
tion with the judge's dismissal of the venireperson. Justice O'Connor
argued that because the trial court's act in Edmonson was de
minimis, the act in itself was not substantial state action, and fur-
ther, the judge's act did not cause the attorney's act to rise to the
level of state action.2 45
To support her position, Justice O'Connor relied on Jackson v. Met-
ropolitan Edison Co. 246 and Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks.247 In Jackson,
a state-regulated and licensed public utility terminated the plaintiff's
electrical service pursuant to a state-approved procedure for termi-
nating the electric service of those who did not pay their electric
bills.248 The state provided the procedure and endorsed the utility
company's implementation of the procedure. 249 Moreover, the state
would use its coercive power, if necessary, to legitimize the utility
company's behavior.250 Yet, because it was the utility company's
choice to terminate Jackson's service, the Court found no state ac-
tion.251 The analogy to Edmonson is evident; the peremptory chal-
241. Id at 2089-92 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
242. Id at 2090 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
243. Id (O'Connor, J., dissenting.)
244. Id (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
245. Id at 2092 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
246. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
247. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
248. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 346-47.
249. Id In other words, if the customer sued the electric company for terminating
her service, a court would find the company's actions legal because they complied with
state-established procedures. That the company's actions were legal in this case is evi-
dent from the plaintiff's decision not to challenge the utility's actions as violative of
the state-established procedure. Rather, she claimed that the procedure itself was ille-
gal because it violated her fourteenth amendment right to equal protection of the laws,
actionable through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
250. See supra note 249.
251. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 358.
[Vol. 19: 691, 19921 Powers v. Ohio
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
lenge system is a state-established and state-backed procedure
enforced by the state's coercive power. Yet, because it was the pri-
vate counsel's choice to exclude Mr. Edmonson, there was no state
action.
Similarly, in Flagg Brothers, a warehouseman entrusted with goods
subsequently decided to sell them pursuant to state-established pro-
cedures.25 2 The state, through its coercive power, backed the legality
of the subsequent sale.253 The Court reasoned that while the state
provided the mechanism for selling the goods, there was no state ac-
tion because it was the warehouseman's choice to utilize this
mechanism. 25 4
In both Flagq Brothers and Jackson, the government implemented
neutral procedures which private citizens used in a discriminatory
fashion. Moreover, if necessary, the state would back the decisions of
the private parties by the coercive power of the courts. Yet, although
the government implemented the procedures and upheld them when
they were utilized by a private party, this did not convert the act of a
private party into state action. 255 Similarly, where the government
neutrally establishes the peremptory challenge system, and then en-
forces the private exercise of the challenge, the government partici-
pation should not convert private action into state action.25 In its
analysis on this point, the majority did not discuss Flagg Brothers or
Jackson.
2. Traditional State Function
When a private actor engages in functions traditionally considered
to be exclusively reserved for the state, and does so in a discrimina-
tory fashion, courts have generally found state action for which Four-
teenth Amendment relief is afforded.257 On this point, Justice
252. Fagg Brothers, 436 U.S. at 153.
253. Id. at 165. That is, if the previous owner of the goods sued to recover his prop-
erty, the courts would rule against him.
254. Id. See generally, Thomas P. Rowe, Jr., The Emerging Threshold Approach to
State Action Determinations: Trying to Make Sense of Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks,
69 GEO. L.J. 745 (1981) (referring to Jackson, Flagg, and one other case, Moose Lodge
No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), as "the Rehnquist trilogy").
255. 111 S. Ct. at 2091-92 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
256. Id at 2092 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
257. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
But see San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S.
522 (1987); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Amalgamated Food
Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968); Evans v. Newton, 382
U.S. 296 (1966); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
Kennedy once again began his analysis in Edmonson by focusing not
on the private actor, but on the general character of a jury, which
Justice Kennedy described as the "quintessential governmental
body."258 Thus, the majority found state action because, "[t]he per-
emptory challenge is used in selecting an entity that is a quintessen-
tial governmental body, having no attributes of a private actor." 259
The majority argued from the premise in Terry v. Adams, 260 that
the selection of state officials constitutes state action.261 In Terry, a
private political quasi-governmental organization in which only Cau-
casian Americans were allowed to participate chose the democratic
party's candidate in the primaries.262 The Court found that the selec-
tion of a political candidate was a traditional governmental function,
and therefore, the actions of the private organization in this regard
constituted state action.263 The Edmonson majority argued by anal-
ogy that the selection of a jury, a body of state officials, also consti-
tutes state action.264
However, Terry is distinguishable from Edmonson. While the se-
lection of the political candidate in Terry may be considered a tradi-
tional government function, the selection of the jury in Edmonson
stems from a "'tradition'. . . of unguided private choice." 265 Instead
of disputing this historical assertion, the majority maintained its ar-
gument that because the jury is a governmental body, the choice of a
private attorney is state action.266 It might also be argued that the
private individual voters choosing a candidate in Terry can be analo-
gized to the private individual attorneys exercising peremptory chal-
lenges in Edmonson. However, this analogy is not germane. In
Terry, it was not individual voters who chose the candidate in a gen-
eral election, but a quasi-governmental political organization which
chose a candidate in the primaries. Thus, unless the majority is
claiming that a private attorney is analogous to a quasi-governmental
political organization, the comparison is not persuasive.
267
258. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2085. The difficulty in the majority's argument ap-
pears evident from a reading of its own statement. Here, Kennedy's argument was
that a jury "ha[s] no attributes of a private actor." I&. But, whether the jury is a pri-
vate or state actor seems beside the point. The question is whether the private attor-
ney is or is not a state actor under the circumstances.
259. Id.
260. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
261. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2085.
262. Terry, 345 U.S. at 463-64.
263. Id at 477.
264. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2086.
265. 1I at 2093 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the history of per-
emptory challenges, see supra notes 19-99 and accompanying text.
266. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2085.
267. See id. at 2080-81. It is true that an attorney is an " ' officer [] of the court.'"
State Bar of California v. Superior Court, 278 P. 432, 435 (1929). However, rarely, if
ever, are the decisions of a private attorney deemed to be those of the court. In other
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Justice O'Connor, in her dissent, disputed the majority's statement
of the law.2 6 8 The majority found that in order to be state action, the
private action must be "a traditional function of government." 26 9
However, the majority did not address the issue of whether the func-
tion was exclusively that of the government. As stated in Jackson
and Flagg Brothers, and as pointed out by Justice O'Connor's dissent
in Edmonson, to engage in state action, the private actor must exer-
cise "powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State."2 7 0 Thus,
"to constitute state action under this doctrine, private conduct must
not only comprise something that the government traditionally does,
but something that only the government traditionally does."'71
While the majority argued that the exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges is a traditional government function,272 it is more difficult to
assert that the exercise of a peremptory challenge is exclusively a
government function.
Next, the majority analyzed Polk County v. Dodson,273 a case in
which a public defender was not considered to be a state actor when
representating a criminal client.27 4, To distinguish Dodson, the Ed-
tasks in the practice of law, such as filing motions, discovery, etc., the attorney acts on
his client's behalf, rarely on behalf of the government. Yet, nearly every task per-
formed by an attorney requires court approval in some way. Complaints need to be
accepted by the court. Discovery requests may only be enforced by court-backed mo-
tions to compel. The rules applying to the taking of depositions are only valid to the
extent that they aure backed by the authority of the court. The Court's ruling in Ed-
monson could conceivably make each of these tasks performed by an attorney subject
to the state-action doctrine.
268. Id. at 2093 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
269. Id. at 2085.
270. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352 (emphasis added). See Flagg Brothers, 436 U.S. at 159;
Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2093 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The majority in Edmonson
chose not to adhere to the exclusivity requirement. Professor Choper made the fol-
lowing comments regarding the Edmonson Court's handling of the exclusivity
requirement:
Kennedy never used the key limiting word used by the Burger-Rehnquist
Court - 'exclusively.' . . . Instead of asking the critical question of whether
the function here is one exclusively reserved to the states, Kennedy said the
jury is 'a quintessential government body,' and a private person is then given
the power (through the jury selection process) to choose government
employees.
CHOPER, supra note 9, at 12. For a discussion of the exclusivity requirement, see The
Supreme Cour4 1977 Term, 92 HARv. L. REV. 57 (1978) (in deciding Flagg Brothers, the
Burger Court extracted an exclusivity requirement from the facts, but not the ration-
ale of previous state action cases).
271. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2093 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
272. Id. at 2085.
273. 454 U.S. 312 (1981)
274. Dodson, 454 U.S. at 317. See generally Kenneth S. Schlesinger, Polk County v.
Dodson: Liability Under Section 1983 for a Public Defender's Failure to Provide Ade-
monson Court asserted that while the public defender representing a
criminal client is in a position adverse to the government, a private
litigator and the government "work for the same end" in selecting a
jury.2 75 Thus, the Court reasoned that a private litigator should be
considered a state actor.276
However, there are difficulties with the Court's position. First, the
majority's position contains logical inconsistencies. The majority ar-
gued that a public defender is not a state actor because the public de-
fender shares an adversarial relationship with the government. 277
However, the Court then concluded that Mr. Edmonson was a state
actor because, as a civil litigant, he was not in an adversarial relation-
ship with the government.2 78 The Court, in effect, argued that one
who is not in an adversarial relationship with the government is a
state actor. Yet, not being in an adversarial relationship with the
government does not necessarily make one a state actor.
Second, Justice Kennedy's contention that a private litigator and
the government "work for the same end" in choosing a jury is troub-
lesome.279 In any civil trial in which the government is not a party,
the government's goal, achieved through the judge, is to ensure that a
fair jury is chosen. However, the goal of the private attorney is to
choose a jury that is disposed to find in favor of her client. These
goals are not synonymous. In any civil case, where each litigant at-
tempts to choose a jury that will rule in his favor, it is logically im-
possible for the government, through the judge, to work for the ends
of both litigants simultaneously. Consequently, the government must
remain neutral. As Justice O'Connor's dissent explained, "That's the
point. The government does not encourage or approve these strikes,
or direct that they be used in any particular way, or even that they
be used at all. The government is simply not 'responsible' for the use
of peremptory strikes by private litigants."28 0
Finally, in attempting to establish that the exercise of peremptory
challenges by a private litigant in a civil trial is "a power 'tradition-
ally exclusively reserved to the State,' "281 the majority cited to West
quate Counsel, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1291 (1982) (agreeing with Justice Blackmun's dissent
in Dodson and arguing that public defenders act under color of state law); Jeffrey C.
Gilbert, In Defense of Public Defenders: Polk County v. Dodson, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV.
599 (1982) (arguing that Dodson found no state action merely as a device to limit sec-
tion 1983 actions against public defenders.)
275. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2086.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 2095 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
281. Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157 (1978) (quoting Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974)).
[Vol. 19: 691, 19921 Powers v. Ohio
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
v. Atkins.282 In West, a state prison inmate brought a claim against a
private physician hired by the prison.28 3 The prisoner claimed that
the doctor had deprived him of necessary medical care. 28 4 In ruling
that the doctor was a state actor, the Court reasoned that the doctor's
actions could fairly be attributed to the state.28 5 The Edmonson ma-
jority's analysis of West was merely a conclusory statement that
"when private litigants participate in the selection of jurors, they
serve an important function within the government and act with its
substantial assistance." 28 6 The majority then concluded by decrying
the evils of discrimination. 287
Justice O'Co:nnor ended her dissent with a discussion of two more
cases, Rendell-Baker v. Kohn 288 and Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co.,289 neither of which were discussed by the majority.29 0 Both cases
stand for the proposition that performance of a state-regulated or
state-funded function is not state action unless that action is tradi-
tionally the exclusive prerogative of the State.29 1
D. Aggravated by Incidence of Governmental Authority
At the close of the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy posited his
version of the "aggravated by incidence of governmental authority"
test.2 92 He employed a novel "location" argument which now joins
the ranks of state action jurisprudence: "[Tihe injury caused by dis-
crimination is made more severe because the government permits it
to occur within the courthouse itself."293 The majority did not cite to
any authority for this proposition,29 4 and did not attempt to distin-
guish Polk County v. Dodson,29 5 a case in which discriminatory acts,
performed within the courtroom, were not considered to be state ac-
282. 487 U.S. 42 (1988).
283. West, 487 U.S. at 44.
284. Id. at 45.
285. Id. at 56-57.
286. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2087.
287. Id.
288. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (discriminatory actions of a state-
funded private school for maladjusted students not considered state action).
289. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (the alleged discrimi-
natory actions of a state-regulated utility not considered state action).
290. Edmonson, 111 S.Ct. at 2091-93 (O'Connor, J., dissenting.)
291. See Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. 830; Jackson, 419 U.S. 345.
292. 111 S. Ct. at 2083.
293. Id. at 2087.
294. Id.
295. 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
tion.296 The majority concluded its state action analysis by once again
expressing a general concern regarding the invidious effects of racial
discrimination in the judicial system.m91
V. IMPACT
The impact of the Court's decisions in Powers and Edmonson is not
difficult to ascertain. As the law stands, the prosecution in a criminal
case may not use peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory
manner.298 Moreover, all civil litigants are bound by this standard.299
A. Defendants' Use of Peremptory Challenges
The remaining questions concern whether a defendant in a crimi-
nal case may use peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory
manner,3 00 and whether litigants, civil or criminal, may use gender
discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges. 301
Although several circuit courts have ruled on these issues,302 the
Supreme Court has yet to speak. Following the principles set out in
Polk County v. Dodson,30s it would seem difficult for the Court to
find that defense attorneys are state actors. However, with its new
"location" rationale for state action, it is now possible that the Court
may find criminal defense attorneys to be state actors3 4 because
their discriminatory use of peremptory challenges would necessarily
occur in the courtroom.305
296. 1&. at 334.
297. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2088.
298. Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
299. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2088 (1991).
300. The Court recently granted a writ of certiorari to decide this very issue. State
v. McCollum, 405 S.E.2d 688 (Ga. 1991), cert granted, 112 S. Ct. (1991).
301. See Sex-Based Juror Exclusions Reviewed, FAcTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIG.,
June 13, 1991, § El, at 442.
302. Compare United States v. DeGross, 913 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1990), reh'g en banc
granted, 930 F.2d 695 (1991) (holding that an attorney may not discriminate on the ba-
sis of gender in exercising peremptory challenges); State v. Levinson, 795 P.2d 845
(Haw. 1990) (discriminatory use of peremptory challenge to exclude female from jury
based on gender violates state constitution equal protection clause); with Di Donato v.
Santini, 283 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1991) (California Court of Appeal let stand a superior court
decision precluding the exclusion of women from the jury on the basis of gender).
303. 454 U.S. 312 (1981). In Dodson, the Court held that a public defender is not a
state actor because he is in an adversarial relationship with the government. Id. at 326-
27.
304. One court stated that because of the Court's reasoning in Edmonson, it is "in-
escapable" that the Supreme Court will extend the availability of the Batson challenge
to prosecutors. State v. Anaya, No. CA-CR 90-0110, 1991 WL 186989 (Ariz. App. Sept.
19, 1991).
305. See supra note 293 and accompanying text. It is foreseeable that a different
analysis would be used for public defenders as opposed to private criminal defense
attorneys.
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B. Gender Discrimination
Moreover, it might be difficult to extend the Court's rationale in
Batson, Powers, and Edmonson to issues of gender.3 06 One reason is
that gender challenges would not be limited to women. A gender
challenge could be brought when a man is discriminatorially ex-
cluded from a jury. Other issues which might be considered in the
future are whether attorneys may use peremptory challenges to dis-
criminate on the basis of sexual preference, religion, age, language30 7
and residency.os
C. Administrative Burden of New Challenges
Several commentators have echoed Justice Scalia's concern with
respect to the logistical burden Edmonson and Powers impose on the
courts.3 9 They argue that the Edmonson challenge, combined with
the Powers and Batson challenges, will bring the peremptory chal-
lenge system to a halt.3s0 In an attempt to stall or impose burdens on
the opposing side, counsel could virtually challenge every attempt to
strike a juror. This is because any time two women, two men, or two
minorities are excused consecutively, a challenge could be raised.
The repercussions of this dilemma could cause one of two results.
The courts could become clogged with endless challenges to peremp-
tory strikes, thus imposing heavy financial burdens on the courts and
the parties. On the other hand, attorneys might simply choose to re-
frain from using peremptory challenges altogether, seriously hinder-
ing the process of empaneling impartial juries.
It is unclear which, if either, of these scenarios will occur. "The fu-
ture likely holds a combination of the two. However, the immediate
effect of the Powers and Edmonson decisions will not be disastrous.
But they do add two more straws to the proverbial camel's back.
306. But see supra note 301.
307. Peremptory Strikes of Bilingual Jurors Weren't Based on Racial Discrimina-
tion, BNA WASH. INSIDER, May 29, 1991.
308. United States v. Bishop, 60 U.S.L.W. 2639 (9th Cir. Mar. 25, 1992) (exclusion of
a venireperson based on residence in a low income, high crime, African American
neighborhood deemed unconstitutional).
309. Aaron J. Broder, Trial Tactics and Techniques, N.Y. LAW JOURNAL, July 1,
1991 at 3 (explaining the practical implications of the Edmonson and Powers decisions);
James P. Connors, "Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co. ": Effect on the Civil Jury Se-
lection Process, N.Y. LAW JOURNAL, August 9, 1991 at 1. But see Joseph Kelner &
Robert S. Kelner, Civil Jury Selection Under 'Edmonson', N.Y. LAW JOURNAL, June
25, 1991. (agreeing with the Edmonson majority that the extension of the Batson chal-
lenge will improve the judicial system).
310. See Broder, supra note 309, at 3.
D. Aberrational Nature of Holdings
The broader impact of the Court's holdings, however, does warrant
comment. Professor Choper saw the state action holding in Edmon-
son as "aberrational."311 If this is true, then the decision might go
the way of Shelley v. Kramer,3 12 lost in the black hole of anomalous
Court decisions.3 13 This assessment appears to ring true considering
the Rehnquist Court's track record in state action cases.314 The third
party standing holding in Powers could also be seen as aberrational.
Labeling the connection between an excluded venireperson and a
criminal as a "close relationship" seems to be a proposition that will
not withstand future scrutiny.
E. Political Nature of Decision
What is not aberrational, however, is the political nature of the
Court's behavior. Unfortunately, this dimension of judging is ever
present and always tempting. Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist
Papers offered the following comments which speak to this issue:
Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power must per-
ceive that in a government in which they are separated from each other, the
judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous
to the political rights of the constitution; because it will be least in a capacity
to annoy or injure them. The executive not only dispenses the honors, but
holds the sword of the community. The legislature not only commands the
purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen
are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over
either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or the
wealth of the society, and can take no active resolution whatever. It may
truly be said to have neither force nor will but merely judgment; and must
ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of
its judgments. 3 1 5
Hamilton went on to proclaim, "inhere is not liberty if the power of
judging be not separated from the legislative and executive
powers." 3 1 6
Because of the problems of third party standing and state action,
the sensible solution to the problem of racism in the courtroom must
originate in the legislature rather than the courts. Such a legislative
solution was proposed by the Honorable George Bundy Smith. Judge
Smith suggested that any legislation authorizing peremptory chal-
311. See CHOPER, aupra note 9, at 2.
312. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
313. "The Supreme Court . .. has refused to apply Shelley." Chemerinsky, supra
note 194, at 526 (citing R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 528 (1976) ("Shelley had no lasting
impact")).
314. See Choper, supra note 10, at 8. Professor Choper commented that Edmonson
"is more a reflection of [Justice] Kennedy's personal abhorrence of racial discrimina-
tion." Id.
315. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 522-23 (Alexander Hamilton) (Wesleyan U. ed.
1961).
316. Id at 523 (quoting I. MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF LAwS, 181).
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lenges be amended with "one simple sentence as follows: The per-
emptory challenge shall not be used by either the prosecutor or the
defendant to exclude a prospective juror solely on the basis of race or
color." 317 Such an amendment could also include phrasing preclud-
ing discrimination based on gender, and it could be extended to the
civil arena.
VI. CONCLUSION
At the heart of American democracy is the belief that the logic and
debate of the marketplace, not coercion or violence, is the vehicle by
which individual attitudes and beliefs are challenged and ultimately
changed. Inherent in this system is the fundamental notion that peo-
ple cannot and must not be forced to embrace any given political or
social belief, regardless of how right or desirable it appears to be. Co-
ercing a private party to conform her behavior to a given set of social
or political beliefs leads not to a constructive and enduring transfor-
mation of society's worldview, but rather to resentment and bitter-
ness toward the government. Such a policy divides rather than
unifies.
It is true that where the government is truly an actor, the Consti-
tution speaks loudly and clearly that the government is not permit-
ted to discriminate. The State may not be a perpetrator in the racism
travesty. However, when the State oversteps its bounds and en-
croaches upon the right to freedom of expression and belief treasured
by every American citizen, the State has gone too far, and the ulti-
mate consequences will inevitably be destructive.
In Powers v. Ohio318 and Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,3 19
the Court seemed to strain its traditional limitations in order to at-
tain the short-term goal of racial equality in the courtroom.
Although battling racism is a worthy goal, Justice Scalia castigated
the majority for taking a "self-satisfying" stance in its "unmeasured
and misdirected" blow against racism.3 20
For example, the Court held that a person may litigate the inter-
ests of a third party where the two parties share a "common inter-
est."321 In Powers, the common and laudable interest was to rid the
courtrooms of discrimination. But, in the next case, virtually anyone
317. Honorable George Bundy Smith, supra note 69, at 1594.
318. 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
319. 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
320. Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1382 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
321. 1d at 1372.
may have access to the courts, regardless of whether they themselves
have been injured, as long as they share a common interest with
some person who has been injured in some way and is unwilling to
litigate. This strained interpretation of the "case or controversy" re-
quirement could easily lead to an influx of litigation, wholly unin-
tended by the framers of the Constitution. As Justice Scalia stated in
his separate dissent in Edmonson:
[Ilt is a certainty that the amount of judges' and lawyers' time devoted to im-
plementing today's newly discovered Law of the Land will be enormous. That
time will be diverted from other matters, and the overall system of justice
will certainly suffer. [Miuch of [the price] will be paid by the minority liti-
gants who use our courts.
3 2 2
These recent peremptory challenge rulings also continue the rem-
edy inaugurated in Miranda v. Arizona3 23 of using the key to the
jailhouse door "not to free the arguably innocent, but to threaten re-
lease upon the [sic] society of the unquestionably guilty unless [gov-
ernment officials] take certain steps that the Court newly announces
to be required by law."3 24 In Powers, a murderer's conviction was
overturned because a venireperson's rights were violated.325 In ef-
fect, the Court argued that because A's rights were violated, B should
be rewarded. Yet, the Court never intimated that the defendant did
not get a fair trial. This type of remedy is difficult to justify.
It is acknowledged that in a Batson case, where the defendant dem-
onstrates injury, a new trial might be a justifiable remedy. Yet, in
Powers, the rights violated were admittedly those of the venireper-
son. In such a case, if the venireperson did come forward and win an
equal protection claim against the prosecutor, the remedies would
flow from Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code.326 How-
ever, even this section provides for monetary and injunctive relief for
the victim of the discrimination, not a third party who witnessed the
discrimination.327 In a Powers scenario, it is unrealistic to assume
that an excluded venireperson would have wanted, as part of her
322. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2096 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
323. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
324. Powers 111 S. Ct. at 1381.
325. Id at 1374.
326. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For
the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
327. Id
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damages, the convicted murderer to receive a new trial. Yet, this is
the remedy the Court implemented.
Racism continues to be a provocative and serious problem facing
this nation. It is an emotionally charged issue which penetrates the
hearts and minds of all who come in contact with it, and tragically,
the destructive effects of racial hatred are widespread. Recently,
however, "racial equality" seems to have approached the status of a
sacred cow, "unreasonably immune from ordinary criticism."32 8 Yet,
even worthwhile goals must not be achieved through overlooking
precedent and straining existing law, lest we end up winning the pro-
verbial battle, but losing the war. Hopefully, racial equality will not
approach the status of a litmus test, predetermining the outcome of
cases involving race. In the words of the Holland Court: "The ear-
nestness of this Court's commitment to racial justice is not to be mea-
sured by its willingness to expand constitutional provisions designed
for other purposes beyond their proper bounds."329
BRADLEY R. KIRK
328. Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1966).
329. Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803, 811 (1990).

